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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JOSEPH JUDKIXS, D_A_X J. ~IILLER,
FRANK OBORN, and ...\DRI.:~N DE BLOOIS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
BOYD N. FRONK,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 7600
We are of the opinion that a Reply Brief may he
helpful to the court in- this case.
The case of National Lumber Products Company
vs. Ponzio, N.J., 42 Atl. (2) 753, cited by respondents
at page, 12 of their Brief is not in point. This is a case
in which the plaintiff installed a planing machine in a
lumber yard which was already a non-conforming use.
Therefore it is a case of increasing an already nonconforming use and not one where a use was authorized
at the time of issuance of a permit and a subsequent
ordinance enacted prohibiting the use. Also it appeared
that plaintiff could have had lumber planed outside of
his yard with very little delay so that his filling war
contracts would not be materially affected.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Respondents a.t page 12 of their brief cite the case
of Wilkins vs. San Bernardino et al Calif. (1946) 175
Pac.. (2) 542. In tha.t case the property owner deliberately violated the zoning ordinance by building a multiple dwelling and therefore the court denied relief in a
declaratory judgment action. The court, however, at
page 551 la.ys down a principle of law which supports
the appellant's contention in the case a.t bar. There
the court says :

''The fact that there- is a housing shortage
might justify the city, or perhaps even the court,
under proper conditions, in te·mporarily suspending the operation of the zoning ordinance during an emergency, but it furnishes no justification for a judicial decision voiding the operation of the ordinance for all time to come or for
plaintiffs action in violating the ordinance.''
Cases are cited in support of the· proposition
that the· local body or In proper cases the
court, may in time of war emergency suspend the operation of an ordinance·. Among the cases cited is that of
City of San Diego vs. Van Winkle, 158 Pac. (2)
774, (Calif.) 1945. This was an action by the City of
San Diego to enjoin defendants from violating the City
zoning- ordinance·. From that portion of the judgment
which suspended during the war emergency the enforcement of the injunction which forever enjoined defendants from occupying or permitting any person to
occupy the duplex dwelling on defendant '-s property,
the City appealed and the District Court of Appeal of
California affirmed such judgment so suspending that
portion of the injunction. Defendants were the owners
of real property located in LaJ olla in the City of San
2
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Diego. It "?as ~i tua ted in a zone where only single
family d\Ye lling·s could be erected. In February of
194~, the defendant8 "?ithout intention to violate the
ordinance, eommenrPd the preetion of a duplex dwelling
house and subsequently completed it. The apartments
"·ere occ.upied by officer8 in the armed forces on active
duty. It appeared and the eourt took judicial notice
of the OYtlrcro,vded conditions existing in the San Diego
area and of the \Yar emergency. It \Vas argued by the
plaintiff that its zoning· ordinances a.re an exercise of
police power and if they are not arbitrary, discriminatory nor oppressive the courts must enforce them and
that the trial court had no jurisdiction to either refuse
or to stay an injunction. The defendants admitted
such rules generally but argued that the war emergency
and the housing shortage permitted a court in exercising its equity jurisdiction to suspend the operation
of the ordinance during the war emergency. This contention was upheld by the court in this case. The court
further pointed out that the rent regulations, which
were a part of the Emergency Price Control Act and
hence a part of the emergency war legislation and regulations, would prevent eviction of the tenants and tha.t
the defendants could not obey both the state and federal
regulations. The court held that regulations passed
under constitutional authority suspend state or local
laws or regulations in conflict with them and that this
doctrine is not new. Many cases are cited by the court
so holding. The court held the case squarely within
the rule announced in the case of Realty Revenue Corporation vs. Wilson 182 Misc. 552, 50 N.Y.S. (2) 941,
942, which was a New York case in which the Realty
Revenue Corporation owned an apartment house in the

a·
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C_ity of New York which apartment house did not conform to the health and safety laws. The Commissioner
of Housing and Buildings of the City of New York required the owner to cause the- building to be vacated
a.s unfit for human habitation and dangerous to life and
health by reason of defects consisting of failure to provide a sprinkling system, an interior fire alarm system
and self-closing fireproof doors. The owner brought
the action to enjoin the Commissioner from enforcing
the order. It developed that the War Production Board
had refused to give a priority to the owner for materials necessary to make the required changes so the
owner was unable to make the building safe and to
conform with the requirements of the law. The Supreme
Court of New York adopted certain portions of the
opinion of the Trial Judge from which the following
is quoted by the California Court at page 778 of 158
Pac. Rep. ( 2) as follows :
''Contrary to what perhaps may be a popular
impression, the constitutionality of law depends,
not upon abstract theory or philosophy but upon
a very practical application of laws to facts, and
a statute which is valid as to one set of facts
may be invalid as to another, and one which is
valid when enacted may become invalid by change
in the conditions to which it is applied. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry vs. Walters, 294 U. S. 405,
414, 415, 55 S. Ct. 486, 79 L. ed. 949; Municipal
Gas Co. of City of Albany vs. Public Service Commission, 2 District, 225 N.Y. 89, 95, 96, 121 N.E.
772, 773, 77 4). Owners of multiple dwellings
may he subjected to uncompensated obedience
4
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to many reg-ulation~ \Yhich are costly and burdensome to them but to enforce against them regulations "·hirh the Federal government says they
~hall not comply \Yith "?ould be an unreasonable
and unconstitutional deprivation of their rights.
State commands and Federal prohibitions cannot
be allo,Yed to become upper and nether millstones bet\Yeen "Thich the rights of citize11s are
gTound to bit~ ... The Commissioner will not be
stayed if " . alls, floors and ceilings are falling
do\vn or if unsanitary conditions make disease
imminent. It thus may be that if inability to
g·et materials eontinues for a long period, there
may come a time when owners of such dwellings
will have to submit to having them vacated. Upon
the papers now presented it does not appear
that that point has been reached in this case ...
The State's statutory standards stands upon the
statute books capable of enforcement whenever
and wherever the Federal prohibition does not
interfere, but while the Federal prohibition continues, and in those cases to which it applies,
the State's Statutory standard remains in suspended animation.''
It was concluded by the New York court that as the
apartment house was reasonably safe, the Commissioner
of Housing and Building of the City of New York
should he enjoined from enforcing the ordeT to vacate
the building ''during the present emergency or until
such time as the War Production Board releases the
required materials.'' The California court in the San
Diego case reached a conclusion that the trial court was
not guilty of any breach of discretion in suspending
the execution of. the injunction during the present wal'
5
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emergency and the existing housing shortage in San
Diego and that he was fully justified in exercising· his
equitable powers in so doing.
Respondents in their brief say that appellant was a
carpenter and kne-w there were shortages of materials
and a priority was necessary in the years 1943, 1944,
and 1945. It is true that appellant was a carpenter.
However, we submit that there is no evidence in the
record from which a conclusion can be drawn that appellant knew of the necessity for priorities at the time
he obtained his city permit. On c.ross examination of
the appellant by Mr. Adams (Tr. 65 and 66) the following questions and answers were given:

'' Q. Calling your attention to the year of 1943
and 4 and 5, you are acquainted with the fact
during those years that there was a priority on
building materials~
A. I don't recall when the priorities started.
There was some shortages and priority.

Q. Do you remember it being said in this hearing or agreed to that in 1942 the War Production
Board was given authority to ~ation and control
the use of building material. Do you remember
that being agreed to here~
A. Yes, I guess so. I didn't remember reading it.

Q. Well, do you remember that during the time
shortly before the issuance of this first permit
that there wa.s a priority on building mate rails~
A. No, I don't. I don't really know whether
there was or not.
6
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Q. Well, do you remember that there was a

scarcity of materials during that time for construction "'"ork of all kinds'

A. There may haYe been. Of course I worked for
the g·overnment and "rasn 't acquainted with trying to get them then.
Q. I think that's all the questions I have."

Consequently we cnnnot agree with the statement of
counsel nor the finding of the court with respect to
appellant's knowledge of priorities and shortages at
the time he obtained his p.ermit.
Respondents in their discussion of their point designated number A commencing at p.age 14 of their brief,
contend that the City had no authority to issue a per•
mit in exception to the ordinance. It is not contended
by appellant that the City had the power to gr,ant an
exception to a zoning ordinance. What ap·pellant affirms is that no question of exception to the ordinance
is here involved. .LL\..ppellant obtained his building permit when the ordinances of Ogden City permitted erec- ·
tion of a gasoline filling station on the .site· of his p·roperty. By relying upon that permit, doing work thereunder and expending large sums pursuant thereto, appellant obtained a vested right to complete his construction which vested right could not be a.ffeced by a sub...
sequent amendment of the zoning ordinance. Because
he was prevented from obtaining necessary materials
because of Federal law and the War emergency, he did
not lose his vested right because of inability to comply
with the time provisions in the permit. Never having
lost his vested right in his original p·ermit and it not
having become void by lapse of time for the reasons

7
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above set forth and set forth in his brief, appellant's
original permit remained in force and effect and consequently there was no necessity for issuing a new
permit and no reason for attempting to grant any exception to the zoning ordinance enacted subsequent to
the issuanee of his permit, and consequently there is no
question in this case of an exception to the zoning ordinance. It is clear from the evidence that appellant
sought no exception to the zoning· ordinance but that
he asked the City C.ommis·sion for a renewal of his
original permit. Inasmuch as appellant does not contend that the· City had any power to grant an exception
to a zoning ordinance and that such question is not
involved in this case, the numerous cases cited and
discussed by respondents in their brief on this question
have no application to the case at bar.
It is alleged by respondents in their complaint ili
paragraph seven thereof, that
''On October 13, 1948 the appellant appeared
before- •the Board of Commissioners of Ogden
City Corporation and requested a permit which
he purchased three years ago be renewed, said
permit being for the erection of a service station
at 20th Street on Harrison Boulevard.''
This was the only application before the City Commission and was the application acted upon by the Commission. Respondents futher allege in paragraph seven
of their complaint
''That on October 21, 1948 the following communication was addressed to the Board of Commissioners
by C. R. Kimball, said Engineer.

8
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'Subjeet: . .\pplication for building permit attached hereto. Application made by B. M. Fronk
to ronstruc.t a se rYiee station on the Northeast
corner of Harrison Boulevard and 20th Street.
_Jir. Fronk recently appeared before the Commission asking· that an old permit be renewed
for this eonstruction. The· action taken by the
Commission at that time approved the renewal
of the permit" provided there were no protestants
within a 'Yeek. That period has elapsed and the
application i~ being· submitted for your approval.
Respectfully submitted ·
by C. R. Kimball'
That on October 26, 1948, the above communication was
presented to the Board of City Commissioners and the
same "'"as moved by Mayor Peery, seconded by Thomas
East and voted on by Mayor Peery, Thomas East and
Ed. T. Saunders.''
These allegations in respondents' complaint with
respect to the application for renewal of the permit
and the action taken by the City Commission are admitted by paragraph seven of appellant's answer. Hence
it is alleged and admitted in the pleadings that the application was for renewal of permit and the action of the
Board of City Commissioners was to grant renewal
of the original permit. Statements made by either
the Mayor or the City Engineer a.s to an exception to
the ordinance had no legal effect because both under
the pleadings of the parties and as shown by the exhibits containing the communications to thH City Commission, it is clear that the matter before the Commission was the matter of application for renewal and not

9
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an application for the issuance of a new permit in exeeption to the zoning ordinance of August, 1946. These
allegations in the complaint and admissions made by
the appellant's answer are further substantiated by
the direct testimony of the appellant. ( Tr. 56)
''A. I figured I had to have a renewal of the
permit to go ahead.
Q. And what did you do about

it~

A. 1 went down and asked for a renewal of
permit.
Q. You went down where~

ID)

-··

A. To the City Commission.
Q. And what did the City Commission do in re-

lation to

it~

A. They ruled I ·should.
A. I told the City Commission how I wanted to
renew the permit to go ahead with the building
becau.se I had been unable to get materials before
and had been shut off and wanted to go ahead."
It may not have heen necessary for the appellant
to ask for renewal of his pe·rmit since his vested right
had not been lost therein. However, if it were necessary to seek renewal under the circumstances, then the
renewal by the Board of Commissioners was not in exception to the zoning ordinance of August 1946, but was
a renewal of a validly existing permit issued prior to
the ·ordinance of August, 1946, and at a. time when it
was permitted under the zoning ordinances to build a
service station in the locality in question. Respondents

10
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quote the case of Walton Ys. TTaey Loan & Trust Company 97 Utah ~49, 92 Par. (2) 724, as an authority for
the .proposition that only the Board of Adjustment has
authority to g-rant exeeptious to zoning· ordinance-s. The
exceptions in that case held to be within the- power of
the Board of Adjustment to make, are minor exceptions such as Ya.rianre of side lines and height of building. This court in the Walton case clearly held that
the Board of Adjustment had no power whatever to
grant major exceptions; and specifically held that a
Board of Adjustment has no power to grant an exception.
allowing· a. change of use of property. The appellant did
not seek here an exception to the zoning ordinance and if
he had sought -an exception, it would he pertaining to
the use of his property and the Board of Adju-stment
in any event would have had no power to decide his
matter.
Respo:n,dents on page four of their brief, call attention to the fact that the appellant obtained tanks and
pipe of which there was a critical shortage. Appellant
calls attention to the fact that the two tanks which he
obtained for the storing of gasoline in connection with
the service -station were loaned to him by Wasatch Northem Oil Company who had them in their possession
at that time. ( Tr. 43, 51)
The respondents cite the case of Pe-al vs. Gulf Red
Cedar Co. of California, 59 Pac. (2) 182, in which it is
held that abandonment is made up of act and intent and
the intent must be gathered from facts and circumstance in the c.ase. The appellant contends that the testimony clearly shows that he never intended to abandon
the building of the station after he started with its. con-
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struction. The facts also show that he purchased the
ground for the- purpose· of erecting· a service station
thereon (Tr. 30) and that a short time after he had
leveled the ground for the purpose of preparing to
c.onstruct a station there, he installed, by burying in
the ground, two large gasoline tanks which he has never
remove-d and which now are still in place in the ground.
These fac.ts, together with all of his other acts in obtaining and seeking rna terials and applying for priorities,
all clearly show that appellant never intended to abandon the construction of the service station.
The action taken herein by the Board of Commissioners of Ogden City in renewing appellant's- permit
should be sustained. It was an exercise of their proper powers after they had made a through investigation
and after hearings and due deliberation.
Respectfully submitted,
SAMUEL C. POWELL
614 David Eccles Building,
Ogden, Utah
DERRAH B. VAN DYKE
502 David Eccles Building,
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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